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Rövid összefoglaló magyarul 
 
A kutatásban néhány olyan alapvető mechanizmust modelleztünk, amelyek 
diszkriminációhoz vezetnek a munkaerő-felvétel során. Azt vizsgáltuk, hogy milyen 
strukturális feltételek valószínűsítik a diszkriminációt és milyen hálózati feltételek mellett 
kerülhető ez el leginkább. Ágens alapú szimuláció és kísérletek segítségével 
körvonalaztuk, hogy milyen hálózati és keretezési feltételek segítenek a diszkrimináció 
endogén csökkentésében. Ezekhez a célokhoz az EU 7. Keretprogram IEF Programjának 
segítségével nemzetközi kutatói együttműködés létesült F. Squazzonival, M. 
Castellanival (University of Brescia) és G. Bravoval (University of Torino). A 
laboratóriumi kísérleteket Bresciában és Budapesten végeztük. Kulcseredményünk, hogy 
nagy egyenlőtlenségek lehetnek a munkaerő-felvételben akkor is, ha nincs minőségbeli 
különbség a különböző kategóriákba tartozó munkások között és a munkaadók alapvető 
célja a legjobb munkások felvétele. Az ágens alapú modellünkben megmutattuk, hogy a 
társas kapcsolatoknak különböző hatása lehet a diszkriminációra attól függően, hogy 
milyen típusú kapcsolatokról beszélünk. Továbbá, mind a szimuláció, mind a 
laboratóriumi kísérletek megerősítették, hogy a túlzott elvárások magasabb 
diszkriminációs szintet eredményeznek. Az eredményeinket számos nemzetközi 
konferencián prezentáltuk, valamint nemzetközi folyóiratokhoz küldtük publikálásra. A 
kísérleti eredményekből egy bírált könyvfejezet a Wiley kiadónál és egy 
műhelytanulmány már megjelent Torinóban. 
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Rövid összefoglaló angolul 
 
The Evolution, Maintenance and Endogenous Breakdown of Discriminative 
Practices 
 
In this research project we modeled certain fundamental mechanisms that lead to 
discriminative practices in hiring. We analyzed under which structural configurations 
discrimination is likely to occur and under which network conditions they can be 
avoided. With the help of agent-based simulation and laboratory experiments, we 
demonstrated how discrimination can be decreased by social network and priming 
mechanisms. For these objectives and with the support of the FP7 IEF Program of the 
European Union, an international collaboration has been established with F. Squazzoni 
and M. Castellani (University of Brescia) and G. Bravo (University of Torino). 
Laboratory experiments have been conducted in Brescia and in Budapest. Our key 
finding was that large inequality in employment can be pervasive even when there are no 
differences in average quality between different worker categories and employers only 
strive for high quality workers. In our agent-based model we showed that social networks 
might have a different impact on discrimination depending on the type of network ties. In 
addition, both simulations and laboratory experiments confirmed that high aspirations can 
lead to a higher extent of discrimination. Results have been presented at several 
international conferences and are now submitted for publication to international journals. 
A reviewed book chapter by Wiley and a working paper in Torino summarizing 
experimental results have already been published. 
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Részletes beszámoló angolul 
 
I. Motivation 
 
The research project had its focus on the problem of discrimination at hiring decisions. 
Discrimination is a relevant societal problem that undermines equal opportunities and 
threatens social integrity and could lead to severe conflicts. There are different 
recognizable traits (gender, ethnicity, hair color) that often provide a basis for negative 
discrimination. These traits are irrelevant for actions like cooperation or for compliance 
to social norms. Still, people act differently towards persons with different traits, as if 
they were different with regard to cooperation motives or norm obedience. Conflicts 
might occur if statistical discrimination provokes prejudice, labeling, and stigmatizing 
that in practice mostly target only members of one, disadvantaged category.  
In our work, we could successfully demonstrate that large discrepancies between 
employment rates of different groups can occur as unintended results of the hiring 
process even in the lack of existing differences between the groups. Take for instance as 
an example that men and women do not differ on average in a quality that is required for 
a job. We show that even if employers have no in-born biases in favor of men, men could 
be hired disproportionally. 
In particular, we addressed a previously overlooked aspect of discrimination: how social 
networks mechanisms contribute to the establishment of discriminative practices. The 
important role of social networks is well documented for getting a job. It is not clear from 
the existing literature, however, how social networks could lead to less or more 
discrimination.  
The role of social networks is important in job hiring for two different reasons. First, the 
affective content of relationships creates obligations and favors that make hiring and 
recommending friends likely. Humans have the natural tendency to take into account and 
care for the welfare of friends and acquaintances, thereby disrupting the basic logic of a 
„perfect” market. Second, network ties are important channels of information that can be 
used to decrease the information asymmetry present at hiring decisions. Information 
about qualities and opportunities travel via social networks, and in this way networks 
bring the market closer to perfection. 
When social networks are used in hiring because of their affective content, they replace 
meritocratic processes in hiring and result in suboptimal allocations (Ioannides and 
Loury, 2004; Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel, 2000; Tassier and Menczer, 2008). In this 
perspective, employers opt for hiring friends and acquaintances because of their personal 
commitments and due to their easy availability. They act according to their social self 
rather than directly maximizing their market success. The extended use of informal job 
search methods is believed to have a negative effect on the rate of mobility from low 
status to high status jobs (McBrier, 2003: 1212). If one of the groups has a better access 
to informal job search, then this is detrimental for the other group, as in the case of 
referrals from the “old boy network” in a wide range of fields (Rogers, 2000; McBrier, 
2003). 
When referral networks are in use and they are highly segregated, for instance, by ethnic 
group membership, they cause labor market segregation (Model, 1993; Tilly, 1998; 
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Elliott, 2001). Disadvantaged groups, especially with language deficiencies, rely more 
likely on insider referrals than advantaged (majority) groups, which further downgrades 
their mobility chances (Elliott, 1999; 2001; Green, Tigges, and Diaz, 1999). Members of 
a particular ethnic group tend to recommend their friends with the same ethnic 
background. Therefore, the employment statuses of path-connected workers are 
correlated (Krauth, 2004; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; 2007). In case of 
segregated referral networks, groups with different reservation wages will receive 
different wages and firms can induce such segregation and discriminate between groups 
to increase their profit (Barr, 2009).  
We used innovative methodologies of agent-based simulation and laboratory experiments 
with students as fictive employers to model and explain discrimination mechanisms. With 
these innovative methodologies, we were able to demonstrate that discrimination can be 
immense even in the lack of statistical differences between the qualities of the members 
of different group. Furthermore, we derived and analyzed predictions about how and 
which social structures help to eliminate discriminative judgments and practices. The 
results of our analyses contribute largely to the scientific understanding of discrimination 
and have practical implications for social policy to successfully tackle discrimination. 
 
II. Results summary 
 
Although many economists believe in optimal matching of jobs and employers in the 
labor market, in reality, dramatic employment discrepancies and mismatches can be 
experienced. This research project has shown that suboptimal situations occur even if 
there are no objective differences between groups of employees and employers are not 
biased initially. 
First, we demonstrated by using a simple computational agent-based model that a certain 
level of employer discrimination is an inevitable consequence of asymmetric information 
and of limited supply of skilled labor. Moreover, our experiments found a prevalence of 
high discrimination rates in all experimental conditions, despite of the lack of quality 
differences between the groups.  
Second, our simulations illustrated how higher aspirations of neutral employers could 
lead to higher discrimination rates compared to the situation when employers have low 
aspirations. Employers with high aspirations were also more discriminative than 
employers with low aspirations in our experiments. This finding can enrich existing 
explanations of why we experience more employment discrepancies in high status jobs 
and how can employers be trapped in their determination.  
Third, our agent-based simulations highlighted structural mechanisms that can be 
responsible for the maintenance of discriminative practices. We found that the use of 
referral networks in getting a job does not necessarily increase discrimination in 
employment. Hiring via social network contacts; which could either be worker referrals, 
friendship ties between employers and workers, or business contacts; lower 
discrimination rates compared to the market composed of isolated employers. While 
experiments supported some of our hypotheses regarding network effects, we have not 
received full support for our predictions in the laboratory. The extensive use of worker 
referrals, in particular, has increased discrimination, which was not in line with our 
simulation results, but fits probably better to urban legends. Moreover, experiments 
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highlighted that the interaction of business recommendations, worker referrals, and high 
aspirations that potentially best describes real situations is characterized with the highest 
rates of discrimination. 
Fourth, our simulations revealed how assertive workers could get into high quality jobs 
even if assertiveness is not correlated with qualities and employers are not concerned 
with it. Hence, we could explain how a quality-wage mismatch at the labor market could 
be an unintended consequence of standard hiring practices of profit-seeking employers. 
 
 
III. Agent based simulations 
 
Summary 
 
By building an agent-based model of the hiring process, we showed that social and 
economic suboptimal situations are the rule more than the exception and discrimination 
could take place even when there is no objective quality difference between groups of 
employees; employers do not have discriminative tastes; and employers do not learn 
biased practices from each other. Our simulation results showed that objective differences 
in employment are inevitable consequences of asymmetric information and limited 
supply of skilled labor. Secondly, our results indicated that higher aspirations of fair 
employers tend to generate higher labor market inequality. This can enrich existing 
explanations on why we see higher employment discrepancy in high status jobs. Thirdly, 
we showed that assertive workers end up in high quality jobs even if assertiveness is not 
correlated or even negatively correlated with quality. 
With regard to structural mechanisms, we demonstrated that social networks might have 
a different impact on discrimination depending on the type of ties. While worker referrals 
had a U-shaped effect, with a few referrals reducing discrimination, the structure of 
business recommendations did not play a crucial role. We found that certain social 
network mechanisms might decrease discrimination compared with a market composed 
of atomized employers as networks can allow employers to overcome the sampling bias. 
We also found that ties between workers and employers that are characterized by their 
affective content decrease discrimination more than ties that are characterized purely by 
information exchange. 
 
Model outline 
 
In our model, we considered job hiring decisions for fixed terms in a stable labor market 
with a fixed set of employers complemented by a fixed set of workers (applicants). We 
considered one recognizable trait in the population of workers and two social categories 
of this trait with a fixed category membership (N1=N2). We assumed that there was a 
surplus of labor supply in the market. There were more workers than jobs (J) in each 
period, i.e., N1+N2 > J, but the surplus was not exaggerated. 
We first assumed one-sided matching; where employers chose workers and workers 
automatically accepted any offer. We assumed that employers were perfectly neutral and 
did not belong to any of the social categories. Given that we were not interested in wage 
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discrimination, wage competition and in the behavior of the supply side of the labor 
market, we did not make any differentiations between jobs offered.  
We assumed that workers varied in their quality, but the variation was independent of 
group membership. We explored two configurations. In the default configuration, we 
drew integer values for individual quality from a uniform random distribution in {0, 1, 
…, 19}. In the other configuration, individual quality could take any value and were 
drawn from a normal distribution with a mean of 9.5 and standard deviation of 3, 
irrespectively of group membership. We assumed that individual quality was fixed and 
did not increase with employment. 
The goal of employers was to fill vacant positions in their firms. In each contract period 
(year), employers were asked to fill a predefined number of positions by hiring workers. 
For sake of simplicity, employers filled up available positions randomly. We assumed 
that employers did not have information about individual quality of workers until they 
hired them. After hiring, the worker’s individual quality was remembered by the 
employer for a given period of time, indicated by the memory parameter m. This implied 
that employers have information on a larger pool in the first terms, but the pool size had 
an upper constraint such that employers did not keep record of the quality of workers 
whom they employed for a long time. This could be due to turnover in human resource 
management, destroying old records, or for any other reason. Limited memories 
prevented the system from becoming a market with full information. 
Employers used different channels for hiring. We assumed that employers gave priority 
to workers in house who had a quality above their expected standards. We assumed that 
quality standards were fixed over time and did not vary among employers. 
We distinguished two types of friendship relations that were relevant for hiring: 
friendship ties between employers and workers and friendship ties that connected 
workers in-house with other workers. We assumed that friendship created obligations 
between employers and workers. Friends received priority in employment, if they were 
not employed before. On the other hand, we assumed that friends were not re-employed if 
they did not meet the quality standards or their quality was below group reputation 
scores. It is important to note that we assumed fair employers who could have friends 
from both groups with equal probability. Employer-worker ties were fixed over time 
independently of work experience and worker quality.  
Friendship ties between workers were important for hiring through worker referrals. In-
house employees could recommend their unemployed friends to their employers for a 
job. Note that friendship was independent of quality. Therefore, we did not “hardwire” a 
tendency for homophily based on quality. On the other hand, we assumed that friendship 
ties between workers were strongly homophilous with regard to group membership. Just 
like in other cases, if the recommended worker turned out to be of low quality, the 
employer hired somebody else. 
Moreover, employers could obtain true information on individual quality of previously 
hired workers of business partners and hired them if they were unemployed. We 
considered business ties as mutual relations that were fixed over time and did not imply 
any costs for the partners involved. Therefore, business ties were channels of information 
about individual quality, but depending on the strength of influence in network ties 
(captured by a “group gossip” parameter g), they also shaped group reputation. We 
assumed that each employer formed and updated group reputation in each contract term. 
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Group reputation was the aggregation of individual quality information the employer 
encountered weighted by the reputation information the employer received from business 
partners. Therefore, it was unique to each employer and calculated as a weighted mean of 
individual experience (average quality of previously hired workers from the given group) 
and social influence from business partners. 
In a given contract period, employers were selected in a random sequence to fill one of 
their jobs. This procedure was repeated until vacancies were available. When an 
employer was selected, the hiring decision followed this procedure: 
1. Re-hiring: The employer checked previous employees and re-hired the one with the 
highest quality without a new contract; if this quality met his standards and exceeded 
group reputation scores. 
2. Hiring friends: In case the vacancy could not be filled, the employer hires an 
unemployed friend with unknown quality randomly. 
3. Business recommendations: In case the job was still not filled, one unemployed 
worker, who had the highest quality from previously hired workers of business 
partners was selected; if this quality met the standards of the employer and was higher 
than group reputation scores. 
4. Worker referrals: In case the job was still not filled, one unemployed friend of 
recently employed workers of unknown quality was hired a) randomly or b) in order 
of the quality of referents. 
5. Hiring from the market: In case the job was still not filled; one unemployed worker of 
unknown quality was hired randomly from the group with higher reputation. If group 
reputation was equal, an unemployed worker with unknown quality was randomly 
selected. 
 
Note that our model ignored many aspects that economists would consider central to any 
hiring decision. In particular, the model included no turnover cost and legal restrictions 
on firing, which existed in many countries. It also ignored differential wages. In our view, 
both of these factors would tend to lead employers to stick with employees who were 
good enough rather than the best ones. It is worth noting that our employers followed 
satisfying rather than optimizing criteria as they kept in house all workers who had a 
quality higher than a threshold determined by the employer standards and group 
reputation. Our agent based model has been implemented in NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999). 
Our model has also been re-implemented in Repast to verify implementation coherence 
and to check internal validity. No difference has been found between the results of the 
two implementations. 
 
 
Results: one-sided matching 
 
We first report results from the model in which there were no network effects and hiring 
was based only on information based on personal experience of employers. In this case, 
employers satisfied with the quality of their in-house workers, re-hired them, while 
unsatisfied employers hired new workers on the market. Although discrimination was not 
expected, results showed that even under these ideal-looking conditions, employers could 
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be perfect discriminators. Even more surprisingly, a large disadvantage of one of the 
groups occurred also at the macro level. 
  
 Figure 1. Expected composition of workers at a firm with one round of memory and 6 
jobs. 
Note: Colored bars indicated group reputation. Star symbols represented the expected 
quality of workers drawn from a random uniform distribution. 
 
Figure 1 displays an illustration of a typical scenario of what could happen to a single 
employer. In the first hiring period, a small difference between the average qualities 
normally occurred due to random sampling. This subtle difference resulted in higher 
reputation for one of the groups, say the first one, and in the employment of new workers 
from this group. The expected average quality of these new workers, however, was below 
the average quality of workers from Group 2 who were kept in house in the second year. 
Therefore, the reputation score of Group 2 was higher and resulted in the hiring of four 
new employees from Group 2 in the third year. Yet again, the average quality of the new 
workers was below the reputation of Group 1, and therefore Year 4 was characterized by 
another change of fortune. By the time of the fifth contract term, employees we selected 
from one of the groups, only. This was once more counterbalanced in Year 6, but there 
was no way back from perfect discrimination and a solidified difference in group 
reputations from Year 7 onward. Hence, after quick switches in groups’ fortunes, one 
quality 
contract term (year) 
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group gained an overall dominance, which remained stable over time. Therefore, perfect 
discrimination was the result of the rational search of fair employers. 
 
Affective content: friendship between employers and workers 
To measure discrimination in our simulations, we created a macro level discrimination 
index that looked at inequality in employment at the macro level. For equal group sizes 
and no differences in average quality, we defined the index as 
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where H1≤N1 was the number of hired workers from category 1. The index took the value 
of 0 when no discrimination took place and 1 when all jobs were filled with workers 
belonging to the same category.  
If all employers were perfect discriminators and they perfectly discriminated groups 
randomly, then the δ index provided a low value. To correct for this problem, we created 
a micro level index δi that measured discrimination locally. The δi index simply compared 
the inequality in employment at the level of each individual employer and took the 
average of its distortion. It was calculated for each employer like δ, and then individual 
scores were averaged. The δi index took 0 if nobody discriminated and 1 if everyone 
discriminated perfectly one or the other groups.  
The first major step in our model building strategy was to introduce friendship ties 
between employers and workers. We assumed that due to their affective content, these 
ties were unavoidable assets and burdens for the employers. They were assets in the sense 
that employers hired friends and could keep them committed if friends had high quality, 
while did not re-hire them if their quality turned out to be low. Friendship ties were 
burdens because unemployed friends with unknown working quality should receive 
priority at the hiring decisions.  
It is important to note that at the set up of friendship ties between employers and workers, 
we did not assume any bias, i.e., employers had the same probability to have a link to 
workers in Groups 1 and 2. We manipulated the density of the bipartite friendship 
network between employers and workers and examined how the extent to which 
employers hired friends affected discrimination. 
Our results showed that, under any parameter combination, discrimination did not 
increase with the increasing density of the bipartite friendship network. Vice versa, if fair 
employers had and hired more friends, this helped to diminish discrimination (see Figure 
2). There was a drop in the discrimination indexes if employers had more friendship ties 
to employees. The drop was larger when employer standards were higher. For the higher 
employer standards, every employer was a perfect discriminator if they did not hire 
worker friends, and the discrimination rate was minimal if employers were friends with 
approximately 10% of the workers. In general, in case of a large density of employer-
worker friendship ties, employers hired new workers only from their balanced friendship 
networks and not on the market. 
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Interestingly, hiring friends induced employers to behave more fairly compared with the 
situation where this type of social contacts did not exist, i.e., when employers relied on an 
extended and unbiased social network. In this case, their network pool was sufficiently 
large to ensure a suitable amount of workers with the required skills. To sum up, our 
results showed that commitment to friends, which was not driven by market incentives, 
efficiently reduced information asymmetry and consequently even discrimination. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean values of the of the δ discrimination index (above) and of the δi micro 
level discrimination index (below) across 100 runs for each parameter combination; 
34000 runs in total. Values are averaged for the density of the bipartite friendship 
network and for different employer standards. 
Notes: 6 jobs per employer, no business contacts, m=5, no social ties among workers, 
100 years per run. 
 
employer standards 
friends hired 
friends hired 
employer standards 
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Another interesting finding was that, independently of the density of the social network 
of workers, the density of the bipartite friendship ties had a strong effect on 
discrimination (Figure 3). Indeed, we found that the denser was the bipartite network, the 
lower the discrimination was. With no friendship ties between employers and workers, 
there was a stronger micro level discrimination, which decreased to a fair level thanks to 
hiring friends and worker referrals provided by friends hired before. 
 
The social network of workers 
Previous work brought us to believe that the increasing density of a segregated social 
network of workers could increase micro level discrimination. To test this, we 
manipulated the density of the segregated social network of workers. In the simulation 
setup of the social network, together with the required density, there were two perfectly 
segregated components of the social network among workers with an equal size. Within 
each component, ties were drawn randomly. Ties between the segments were created 
only above the critical value of density so that no more ties were possible within the 
components. During the hiring process, workers who were recently employed by an 
employer could “refer” their friends if jobs were open. Therefore, now employers could 
even pick friends of previously hired workers and benefit from the worker referral 
mechanism. 
Results showed that discrimination quickly dropped with a few worker referrals (see 
Figure 3). This outcome was stable with or without business networks and in any kind of 
business networks. On the other hand, many worker referrals that characterized the denser 
worker network were detrimental for discrimination, especially in the lack of bipartite 
friendship ties.  
This means that we found an interesting and robust U-shaped effect of social network 
density. Discrimination was higher in the complete lack and in the presence of sufficient 
ties among workers, and it was lower if only a couple of ties (40-100 ties in the numerical 
example of Figure 3 with 200 workers) were present. This U-shaped effect occurred in 
each network type, for all values of business network density and for all kinds of different 
specifications of the reputation mechanism. 
It is worth noting that understanding the U-shaped effect is not easy. Results showed that 
a couple of ties between the workers (on average less than one) had an effect similar to 
the effect of employer-worker friendship ties. Indeed, the selection pool was enlarged and 
so discrimination dropped. More ties among workers gave rise to the expected effect 
induced by the segregation of contacts. This means that employers repeatedly hired from 
a dense circle of a single group of employees. 
We found that labor market segregation did not increase by increasing the importance of 
referral hiring. On the other hand, labor market segregation showed a relatively stable 
and fair value across the parameter values of referral density and social network density, 
except for the lack of networks, when labor market segregation was higher. Our 
explanation is that business contact networks were the only information channel and 
alone they could not balance the outcome, as happened with referral networks. 
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no priority, δ discrimination index  priority, δ discrimination index 
 
no priority, δi discrimination index  priority, δi discrimination index 
 
Figure 3. Mean values of the δ discrimination index (above) and the δi micro level 
discrimination index across 100 runs for each parameter combination (32000 for each 
part of the figure). Values are averaged for the density of social networks among workers 
and for the density of the bipartite friendship network between employers and workers. 
On the left: hiring in which no worker had a priority for referrals, on the right: hiring in 
which recommendations by workers with a higher quality were hired first.  
Notes: 5 jobs per employer, random business network with a density of 0.1333; m=5, 
maximum employer standards (19); g=0 and g=0.1, 100 years per run.  
 
Furthermore, if worker ties were used for recommendations, the effect of employer 
standards on discrimination was diminishing. We found that employer standards had a 
stronger impact on discrimination rates both at the micro and at the macro level where 
social network ties among workers were not present.  
 
Information exchange: business networks 
As regards to the effect of network ties between employers on discrimination, we 
assumed that business contacts were fixed over time and did not imply any costs. As 
discussed before, business ties could be exploited to acquire important information about 
in-house worker quality. Therefore, these ties were as means to hire more skilled 
workers. Consequently, it was expected that the density and structure of business contacts 
could have an effect on discrimination. Our hypothesis was that higher density of 
business networks would have determined lower discrimination. 
social network density social network density 
social network density social network density 
friends hired 
friends hired 
friends hired friends hired 
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Figure 4. Average values of the of the δ discrimination index (above) and of the δi micro 
level discrimination index (below) across 100 runs for each parameter combination; 
24000 runs in total. Values are averaged for the density of business networks among 
employers and for different employer standards. 
Notes: 6 jobs per employer, random business network, no ties between employers and 
workers, m=30, 100 years per run. 
 
As shown in Figure 4, we found that business network density decreased discrimination 
at the micro level, but only to a moderate extent. Small differences in the micro level 
discrimination index by the density of business contacts did not aggregate into significant 
differences in the macro level discrimination index. The effect of business networks was 
generally weak when compared with the impact of employer standards and worker 
referrals. Furthermore, business network density had a positive impact on the macro level 
discrimination index when employer standards increased. This small interaction effect 
employer standards 
employer standards 
business network density 
business network density 
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was present under a wide range of conditions, despite the fact that the micro level 
discrimination index decreased by business network density slightly even for higher 
employer standards. 
These results indicated that the direct exchange of information about workers between 
employers could not have a strong effect on discrimination, thereby leaving the problem 
of information asymmetry in the labor market unsolved. Employers still showed bias, 
which were based on the overrepresentation of a few highly skilled in-house workers, 
especially in case of high standards. 
Note that discrimination rates were low in the co-presence of business networks, 
employer-worker contacts, and worker social networks. Without worker referrals 
discrimination rates were higher, but still there was no difference between different 
business network structures. This means that between business partners, individual 
experiences took place more independently than expected and pairwise similarity of 
hiring choices between business partners was at a medium level. The choices of business 
partners were positively correlated, but only weakly. In contrast, without referral 
networks and exchange of group reputation, pairwise similarity in all types of business 
networks dropped to around zero, which indicated that simply merging available 
information on workers did not necessarily lead to correlated choices of employers. 
 
Model extension: two-sided matching 
 
In the two-sided extension of our model, we considered a job market, where employers 
selected employees and workers accepted or rejected offers. We assumed that workers 
had assertiveness levels of {0, 1, …, 19} taken from a uniform random distribution. On 
the other hand, all employers had the same quality standards (aspiration levels) of {0, 1, 
…, 19} or in other simulations, employer aspirations were also taken from a uniform 
random distribution. For the sake of simplicity, we assumed that assertiveness and 
aspiration levels were fixed over time.  
The matching algorithm was the same as in the one-sided matching case, except that 
workers could reject offers. If a selected worker did not know the employer 
professionally (i.e., he/she did not work there before), he/she accepted the contract 
automatically. If the worker knew the employer (i.e., he/she worked there before), he/she 
rejected the proposal if the job quality was below his/her assertiveness level. 
 
Results: two-sided matching 
 
We found that higher aspiration levels of employers led to higher discrimination rates. 
This was a general result under a wide range of parameter values. Figure 5 shows that the 
aspiration trap occurred for aspiration levels higher than the mean of the scale. This 
means that there was no difference in discrimination rates of employers with low and 
medium level of aspiration. Rather, there was a linear increase in discrimination for 
aspiration levels higher than the mean of the scale.  
For the highest aspiration level, Figure 5 shows that almost all employers were perfect 
discriminators. If they randomly favoured one or the other category, in the case of 15 
employers, the expected value of the macro level discrimination index δ was 0.323. The 
fact that the observed value of δ was higher than the expected value indicated that there 
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was more discrepancy between the categories at the macro level than what we would 
have expected from the random distribution of individual discriminating tendencies. 
Note, however, that if the labor supply was radically extended (e.g., until ten times more 
workers than available jobs), then the aspiration trap faded away. The explanation is that, 
in this case, there was an abundance of workers with the highest quality and therefore all 
employers were satisfied easily with their selection. 
Even if worker quality and assertiveness were perfectly independent and employers did 
not take assertiveness into account for selection, we found a concentration of most 
assertive workers in the best jobs. This result was obtained for a wide range of parameter 
values. In the example shown in Figure 5, the correlation between job quality and worker 
assertiveness was around one third for low aspiration levels of employers. The 
explanation is that while assertive workers accepted a job first, they easily stood up from 
their place if they were not satisfied, which brought success for them. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean values and 95% confidence intervals of the micro level δi discrimination 
index (increasing curve above), of the δ discrimination index (increasing curve below), 
of the observed correlation between worker quality and job quality (decreasing curve 
above), and of the observed correlation between assertiveness and job quality 
(decreasing curve below) in a total of 10000 runs when assertiveness and quality of 
workers were perfectly independent. Simulation parameters were as follows: 15 
employers, 6 jobs per employer, N=200, m=10, each simulation run lasted for 100 
contract years. 
 
Although the assertiveness trap appeared under various conditions, it largely decreased if 
employers had the highest aspirations. Therefore, top jobs had the highest discrimination 
rates, but they were also more meritocratic in selection. In these jobs, the assertiveness of 
the worker did not play such a role because only the best workers were kept in house. The 
fact that assertiveness was less important to get the best jobs, however, did not mean that 
discrimination by employers could be justified. 
An interesting finding was that higher aspirations even decreased the concentration of 
best workers in the best jobs. This means that desperate attempts to get the best workers 
not only increased discrimination and unequal handling of equal groups, but have also 
δi discrimination index 
δ discrimination index 
correlation of worker and job quality 
correlation of assertiveness and job quality 
aspiration level 
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resulted in a less meritocratic system, in which the best workers will not end up in the 
best jobs offered. This was due to the fact that there were no sufficient high quality 
workers in the market and employer aspirations were not correlated with job quality.  
Furthermore, we manipulated the correlation between worker quality and assertiveness. 
We expected that increasing this correlation would have strengthened the concentration 
of assertive workers into the best jobs. This was confirmed as we found a positive 
relationship (see Figure 6). When more assertive workers had higher quality, their 
concentration into the best jobs increased. On the other hand, except for extreme values, 
an assertiveness trap occurred even in case of negative correlations between assertiveness 
and quality. This meant that the most assertive workers received the best jobs even if 
their quality was on average lower than that of less assertive workers. Note that assertive 
workers received better jobs even though employers did not take assertiveness into 
account for selection. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean values and 95% confidence intervals of the micro level δi discrimination 
index (slowly increasing curve above), of the δ discrimination index (slowly increasing 
curve below), of the observed correlation between worker quality and job quality 
(quickly increasing curve above), and of the observed correlation between assertiveness 
and job quality (quickly increasing curve below) in a total of 57000 runs. Simulation 
parameters were as follows: 15 employers, 6 jobs per employer, N=200, m={3, 5, 10, 20, 
30, 50}, 0 aspiration level of employers, each simulation run lasted for 100 contract 
years. 
 
Therefore, our results showed that the labor market never achieved a perfect matching of 
worker quality and job quality. The concentration of better workers in better jobs 
improved when the correlation between assertiveness and quality increased, but it did not 
imply a close match of worker and job quality. For instance, in the case of highest 
aspiration levels the correlation between worker and job quality never reached even the 
0.14 level (Figure 7). The labor market mismatch between worker and job quality was 
larger for higher aspiration levels of employers (see Figures 7 and 8). 
As discussed above, higher employer aspirations increased discrimination rates in 
general. A larger correlation between worker quality and assertiveness also increased 
discrimination rates, although less radically (see Figure 6). This was not true in case of 
correlation between assertiveness and quality 
δi discrimination index 
δ discrimination index 
correlation of assertiveness and job quality 
correlation of worker and job quality 
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highest employer aspirations because micro level discrimination δi reached its theoretical 
maximum: every employer was a perfect discriminator (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean values and 95% confidence intervals of the micro level δi discrimination 
index (slowly increasing curve above), of the δ discrimination index (slowly increasing 
curve below), the observed correlation between assertiveness and job quality (quickly 
increasing curve below), and the observed correlation between worker quality and job 
quality (quickly increasing curve above) in a total of 9500 runs. Simulation parameters 
were as follows: 15 employers, 6 jobs per employer, N=200, m=10, aspiration level of 
employers is 19, each simulation run lasted for 100 contract years. 
 
 
Figure 8. Average values of the observed correlation of assertiveness and job quality in a 
total of 57000 runs. Simulation parameters were as follows: 15 employers, 6 jobs per 
employer, 200 workers, m=10, each simulation run lasted for 100 contract years. 
 
Figure 8 shows in detail the relationship between the correlation of assertiveness and 
quality and the occurrence of the assertiveness trap in the critical range of high aspiration 
levels of employers. It is possible to compare how the qualitative differences in the 
relationship in case of lowest and highest aspiration levels (Figures 6 and 7) were related 
to each other.  
correlation of assertiveness and quality 
δi discrimination index 
δ discrimination index 
correlation of assertiveness and job quality 
correlation of worker and job quality 
correlation of assertiveness and quality 
aspiration level 
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Next, we assumed that employers had heterogeneous aspiration levels. This was to check 
whether the aspiration trap and the assertiveness trap were simply due to the uniformity 
of employer aspiration levels. We also wanted to see whether the assignment of workers 
into jobs was more perfect under more realistic conditions, i.e., heterogeneous aspiration 
levels. Figure 9 shows that no qualitative difference was present if we relaxed the 
assumption of homogeneous aspiration levels. 
Furthermore, we tested whether our results were robust against a wider range of 
parameter values. We have not found any major qualitative deviation from the above 
results. Among the control variables, memory of employers had a remarkable effect both 
on discrimination and on the correlation of assertiveness and job quality. This meant that 
longer memories enlarged the available pool of information and so decreased 
discrimination. On the other hand, micro-level discrimination did not extinguish even for 
perfect memories and longer memories have increased the extent of the assertiveness trap 
under any aspiration level and initial correlation of assertiveness and worker quality. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean values and 95% confidence intervals of the micro level δi discrimination 
index (slowly increasing curve above), of the δ discrimination index (slowly increasing 
curve below), of the observed correlation between worker quality and job quality, and of 
the observed correlation between assertiveness and job quality in a total of 9500 runs. 
Notes: 15 employers, 6 jobs per employer, N=200, m=10, aspiration levels of employers 
are taken from a random uniform distribution, each simulation run lasted for 100 contract 
years. 
 
 
IV. Laboratory experiments 
 
Summary 
 
We tested two possible mechanisms that could influence discrimination in an artificial 
labor market, where subjects played the role of employers and were asked to choose 
workers from two groups labeled with colors. The first was a priming mechanism: we 
told subjects that there were sufficient high quality workers among both groups of 
correlation between assertiveness and quality 
δi discrimination index 
δ discrimination index 
correlation of assertiveness and job quality 
correlation of worker and job quality 
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workers. The second was a network mechanism: subjects could benefit from true quality 
information about workers who had been previously employed by other “business 
contacts”. Under each experimental condition, we found significant levels of 
discrimination. We found that subjects discriminated one group strongly more often when 
positive priming took place. The possibility of employing workers from business partners 
increased the average tendency to discriminate, despite the fact that this process reduced 
information asymmetry in the market. Results show that priming and social network 
mechanisms could have unexpected effects for employment inequalities and might 
increase discriminative bias. This would indicate that policy measures aimed at tackling 
discrimination should consider priming and network mechanisms with caution. 
In another experiment, we checked whether referrals from other employers, referrals 
from workers, and higher quality standards requested by employers create inequality in 
employment in an artificial labor market. We found that referrals both from other 
employers and from employed workers increase discrimination in hiring, just as did the 
increase of employer standards. We also found that a combination of high quality 
standards and employers’ referrals may decrease discrimination. Our results show that 
discrimination was higher when both types of referrals took place and employers had 
high standards 
 
Method: Study 1 
 
Experimental design  
 
Our aim with the design was to test whether priming and network referrals could partly 
be responsible for higher or lower discrimination rates in an artificial labor market. We 
designed a simple environment, in which there was no any exogenous bias for or against 
any of the two groups. 
Subjects were seated in a computer lab and listened to the instructions read by the 
experimenter. Twelve subjects were seated at a time in the laboratory and were randomly 
assigned to two groups of six. All interactions occurred anonymously through a computer 
network running the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants also 
received their instructions on paper and could read them on their screens while listening. 
After the instructions, subjects could openly ask questions. Later, no communication of 
any form was permitted and subjects received information solely from their screen. 
Subsequently a quiz tested whether subjects had understood the task correctly. 
The experimental task was as follows. Subjects were asked to imagine that they were 
employers and were invited to hire workers for 8 vacant jobs in each of the 30 periods (a 
period was called a “year”) forming the experiment. Each employment lasted for one 
period only. Subjects were paid at the end of the experiment according to the quality of 
workers they employed. More precisely, they earned their average period payoff, which 
was simply the total quality of hired workers divided by 8. Therefore, subjects were 
motivated to maximize the quality of their workers and to fill all their vacancies. In 
addition, subjects were warned by a computer dialog whenever they wanted to leave the 
stage without selecting the maximum number of workers. They could continue their 
selection after the dialog, if they choose to do so. 
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Each worker was an artificial agent characterized by an ID number, quality, and group 
membership. We used colors (blue and green) to differentiate between members of two 
groups of workers who were identical in size (60-60). Worker quality did not change 
during the experiment and subjects knew this from their instructions. Worker quality was 
assigned from a random uniform distribution in the range of {0, ..., 19}. Subjects were 
informed in advance about the range of qualities, but not about the means or distribution. 
As worker quality was assigned randomly, both groups had a mean quality of 9.5 and a 
uniform distribution of quality. 
In each period of the game, subjects had to fill 5+3 vacancies with available workers 
simultaneously. To fill up the first five positions, they could select from: previously hired 
workers, workers of business friends (in the network condition) and random workers. 
Previously hired workers were displayed on the left side of the screen as a list, sorted by 
ID numbers. In each row, the ID number, group membership and their quality were 
displayed. This meant that subjects knew the quality of workers they had hired during 
previous periods and could hire them again. Subjects could select a worker by clicking on 
the appropriate row. Listed workers were those who were hired by the same employer in 
at least one of the two previous periods. Workers hired previous to these two periods 
disappeared, simulating memory limits or other real-world constraints.  
The option of hiring random workers appeared on the right side of the screen in the form 
of three colored buttons with captions: hiring a random blue worker, hiring a random 
green worker, and hiring a random worker. Subjects were asked to hire workers within a 
limited time. The time remaining was displayed in the upper right corner of their screen.  
The same worker could appear as an available option for multiple employers. In this case, 
the employer who picked the worker first could hire that worker. If a worker was hired 
before the decision limit, the corresponding row disappeared from every other list where 
the worker was displayed. On the screen of the subjects who had actually hired the 
worker, a new line appeared on the bottom of the screen indicating the ID and group 
membership of the worker and the number of vacancies left open. This made subject 
decisions in the experiment interdependent and put them somewhat in time pressure.  
On a subsequent screen, subjects were called to select up to 3 new workers using the 
following options: hiring a random blue worker, hiring a random green worker, and 
hiring a random worker. This two-stage hiring process was intended to see whether 
discrimination occurred in general or only for new employment in our different 
experimental conditions. 
At the end of the experiment and before being paid, participants were asked to complete a 
short questionnaire about their mood and motivations during the experiment. We 
measured computer use frequency as an indicator for disadvantages with regard to 
decision speed. Background questions and the participants’ estimate about the average 
quality of workers were also asked. Earnings were paid in cash immediately at the end of 
the experiment. 
 
Manipulations 
 
We examined hiring decisions using a between-subjects 2 × 2 factorial design. First, we 
manipulated whether or not subjects were repeatedly primed with the information that 
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high quality workers were sufficiently available in both groups. The priming 
manipulation had two parts: 
• The priming message was part of the experimental instructions. 
• The priming message was re-iterated at the end of each period on a separate 
screen. 
Secondly, we manipulated whether subjects could hire previous workers from their 
employer contacts. In the network condition, subjects were arranged in a circle network. 
We chose this setup because it is one of the simplest network structures, in which all 
positions are structurally equivalent. This meant that all subjects had two neighbors each. 
In the network condition, subjects could see the ID, the group membership and the true 
quality of workers who were hired in at least one of the two previous periods by their 
employer contacts. This list was displayed in the middle of their screen in the same way 
as their own workers were listed on the left side of their screen. These workers could also 
be selected by clicking the appropriate row. In the first period, lists were obviously 
empty. Note that as available options were largely overlapping in the network condition, 
if “quick” decision makers were discriminators, then the available pool for “slow” 
decision makers became biased in favor of the other group. This spillover effect, 
however, was compensated by a fairly longer list of available workers (own and of 
employer contacts) in the network condition. 
 
Results of study 1 
 
To analyze discrimination between treatments, we used various measures that all capture 
discrimination slightly differently. All measures, however, summarized one way or 
another the relative extent to which members of the two groups were employed. The first 
was an individual-level index indDiscit that was calculated as the relative difference 
between the numbers of workers hired from the two groups, considering colored choices 
only. So, a worker hired by a “hiring a random worker” option was excluded from the 
calculation. More precisely, indDiscit was calculated for subject i in period t as 
 
indDiscit
ibtigt
ibtigt
HH
HH
+
−
= ,     (1) 
  
where Higt was the number of knowingly green workers hired and Hibt was the number of 
knowingly blue workers hired by subject i in period t. The index was zero when no 
discrimination took place and one when only workers belonging to the same group were 
hired. 
The analysis of indDiscit indicated that discrimination was pervasive in our experimental 
labor market, despite the lack of average quality differences between the groups. The 
index value was significantly different above zero (t=77.322, p=0.000, one sided). We 
found a relatively high level of discrimination in all experimental conditions. The lowest 
value of indDiscit was 0.337 in the baseline condition, which corresponded to an average 
of 5.35 workers hired from one of the groups, and 2.65 workers hired from the other 
group, if all vacancies were filled with colored choices. Other experimental conditions 
showed even higher disparities. 
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In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our manipulations, Figure 10 shows the 
average and dynamics of indDiscit, by the presence of network manipulation (upper 
panel) and by priming manipulation (lower panel). It is interesting to note that 
discrimination increased dramatically after the first period in all experimental conditions. 
This indicates that subjects did not have strong prejudice or preferences for blue or green 
workers at the start of the experiment. However, discrimination immediately increased 
after subjects received their first feedback of worker quality and remained at this 
relatively high level throughout the experiment. As an ex post explanation, subjects used 
in principle the first information they received as an important and meaningful signal of 
group qualities and they quickly over-generalized to other potential candidates. The first 
experience therefore worked as an anchor and created a bias in one way or another.  
 
Treatment Baseline Priming Networks Priming + Networks Total 
indDiscit .338 .347 .455 .442 .396 
strongDiscit .26 .32 .20 .33 .28 
hiredtotalDisci .200 .194 .272 .251 .229 
Decision N 906 1044 1044 870 3864 
Subject N 30 36 36 30 132 
Table 1. Discrimination measurements across treatments in study 1 
 
Figure 10 also shows that values of indDiscit were higher in the network condition than in 
the no-network condition in all subsequent time periods. As there could be no network 
effects in the first period, data from the first period had to be excluded. Moreover, 
although the index provides a scale variable, due to integer values of Higt and Hibt and to 
the upper constraint of 8≥Higt+Hibt, it can only take a few values. For this reason, we used 
non-parametric tests to compare index values between experimental conditions.  
Table 1 shows the index values across experimental conditions. The network 
manipulation contributed to significantly higher values of indDiscit (Wilcoxon rank sum 
test W=3466745, p=0.000). The impact of network manipulation was also significant in 
terms of subject means of indDisci with N=132 (W=3426, p=0.000). Considering the data 
from all periods, discrimination index values were not statistically different between the 
priming and no priming conditions (W=3654260, p=0.196). On the other hand, as 
suggested by Figure 10, the impact of priming manipulation may have decreased over 
time. This is reasonable, as subjects may be more influenced by the priming message at 
the beginning of the experiment, while potentially disregarding or not seriously 
considering the re-iterated message later. Looking at the values of indDiscit in the first 12 
periods, differences were not significant between the priming and no priming conditions 
(W=618466, p=0.309, two sided). Hence, we can reject the hypotheses that priming had a 
significant effect on discrimination at the beginning of the experiment. Differences 
between the priming and the no priming condition in periods 13-30, however, were 
significant (W=1365457.5, p=0.005, two sided). The higher index values in the non-
priming condition could possibly indicate that priming with positive messages may at 
least be effective in the long run in keeping back otherwise increasing discrimination 
tendencies. The decline of indDiscit in the priming condition, however, was very weak 
(from the 7th period assuming a linear tendency: α=.430, βt=-0.002 (t=-1.672, p=.095, not 
significant)).  
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Figure 10. Mean values and dynamics of indDiscit by network manipulation (upper panel) 
and by priming manipulation (lower panel). 
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Figure 11. Mean values and dynamics of strongDiscit by network manipulation (upper 
panel) and by priming manipulation (lower panel) 
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The second measure we used was a binary variable strongDiscit which indicated whether 
subject i was a strong discriminator in period t or not. Strong discrimination meant that 
the subject hired only blues or only greens in the second stage of the task, when it was 
required to select up to 3 new workers. 
Table 2 shows mean values of strongDiscit, while Figure 11 provides a dynamic portrait. 
First, it is interesting to see that there were strong discriminators in every experimental 
condition. Second, it is important to note that this index was not aligned with values of 
indDiscit across the experimental conditions. Results showed that the network 
manipulation determined different and lower values of strongDiscit (W=3645636, 
p=0.048, two sided). Priming significantly increased the presence of strong 
discrimination (W=3587772, p=0.000). The impact of priming was also significant if we 
look at the subject means of strongDisci with N=132 (W=3855.5, p=0.015, two sided). 
Figure 11 shows that strong discrimination also increased dramatically at the beginning 
of the experiment in all experimental conditions, but this upward shift took longer (7 
periods) than the sudden increase in indDiscit.  
These results allow us to conclude that priming increased strong discrimination, but did 
not increase the average discrepancy between groups. Priming was probably effective for 
certain subjects but did not have a general effect. A second conclusion is that networks 
enlarged the impact of bias in general but decreased strong discrimination. 
 
Experimental design of study 2 
 
Subjects played anonymously in groups of six through a computer network, with two 
groups playing simultaneously in the same room to avoid identification of other group 
members. Subjects were asked to imagine that they were employers and were invited to 
hire ten workers per period, which represented one contract year. Workers were virtual 
agents and had ID numbers running from 1 to 200. Each worker had a fixed quality qi 
drawn from a uniform integer distribution in the {0, ..., 19}interval at the beginning of 
the game. Half of the workers were labeled as “blues”, half as “greens”. Given that the 
color held no relation with the quality of workers, the distribution of quality was, on 
average, the same for blues and greens. This meant that any observed discrimination 
depended on the employers’ evaluations and not on actual differences between workers’ 
groups.  
Subjects chose their workers one by one by selecting one of the following options: (i) 
hiring a worker randomly; (ii) hiring a blue worker randomly; (iii) hiring a green worker 
randomly; (iv) hiring one of the workers they hired in the previous period. To allow 
participants to use (iv), a list of the workers hired in the previous period, including their 
qualities and colors, was displayed on the screen. After the hiring stage (i.e., at the end of 
each period), participants were asked to provide an estimation of the average quality of 
both blues and greens.  
In order to simulate turnover, retirement or worker mobility, in each round, workers had a 
10% probability to be excluded from the list displayed to subjects. This meant that these 
workers became unavailable for hiring with the fourth procedure.  
Each experiment lasted for 25 periods. Employers’ profit depended on the quality of the 
hired workers, which was unknown before hiring them except for those hired in the 
previous period. To implement low and high standards experimentally, only the quality of 
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workers exceeding a given threshold τ was used for payment. The threshold was τ = 12 in 
the low standard (–S) condition and τ = 17 in the high standard (+S) condition. More 
specifically, profit was calculated by adding the qualities of workers with qi ≥ τ and by 
dividing the result by ten. Therefore, standards were exogenous constraints on decisions 
in our experiment.  
At the end of each period, the average quality of blue and of green workers hired by the 
subject was calculated and displayed to the given participant along with the number of 
points earned. At the end of the experiment, profits were averaged across all 25 periods, 
with each point being exchanged with 1 Euro. At the end of the experiment and before 
being paid, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire. Earnings were paid 
in cash immediately after the end of the experiment. 
We examined hiring decisions using a between-subjects 2×2×2 factorial design. We 
manipulated these conditions: (i) whether high or low employer standards were imposed, 
(ii) whether employer referrals took place or not, and (iii) whether worker referrals took 
place or not (Table 2). Therefore, eight treatments, four testing for the pure effects of 
these factors and four testing for interaction between them, were contemplated (Table 2). 
 
 Treatment High 
standards 
Employe
r 
referrals 
Worker 
referrals 
Pure effects –S –E –W    
 +S –E –W X   
 –S +E –W  X  
 –S –E +W   X 
Interaction 
effects 
+S +E –W X X  
 –S +E +W  X X 
 +S –E +W X  X 
 +S +E +W X X X 
Table 2: Treatment overview in study 2. 
 
In case of employer referrals (+E), each participant was linked to one other “business 
friend” in a directed circle network with six nodes. In this condition, own workers hired 
in the previous period, and also those hired in the previous period by the business friend 
were displayed, including their color and quality. Furthermore, subjects received their 
friends’ estimates about the average qualities of blues and greens. In the employer 
referrals condition (+E), subjects could also select a worker who was hired by the 
business friend in the previous period (selection procedure v). Note that this meant that 
the same worker could be hired by two or more participants in the same period and best 
workers were not subject to competition by business friends. Therefore, the decision 
speed was unimportant to determine who could hire the best workers. In case of no 
employer referrals (–E), no network existed and none of the subjects knew the workers 
hired by other subjects or others’ estimations of workers’ qualities.  
In the worker referrals condition (+W), each worker hired in the previous period 
“recommended” a friend of the same color, randomly selected, without revealing its 
quality. The suggested workers were shown in a specific list on the participants’ screen. 
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In case of worker referrals (+W), subjects could select a worker from this list (selection 
procedure vi). In case of no worker referrals (–W), participants did not have a list of 
recommended workers. 
 
Results of study 2 
 
Table 3 shows an overview of mean δit values in no-interaction treatments. All factor 
manipulations produced significantly higher discrimination than the baseline (Wilcoxon 
rank sum tests on individual averages: W = 83, p = 0.006 for +S; W = 110, p = 0.052 for 
+E; W = 89, p = 0.010 for +W; all p values are one tailed). 
 
Treatment N Mean SD SE
–S –E –W 450 0.283 0.275 0.013
+S –E –W 450 0.426 0.301 0.014
–S +E –W 450 0.366 0.227 0.011
–S –E +W 450 0.438 0.313 0.015
Table 3: Average micro-level discrimination index in no-interaction treatments. 
 
As our data included repeated observations of the same individual, a random effects (RE) 
model was performed. Table 4 shows the results of the model. The positive intercept 
indicates that a significant level of discrimination occurred in all treatments. This 
supported our first hypothesis. 
  
 Estimate SE t p
(Intercept) 0.257 0.032 8.051 0.000
+S 0.149 0.019 7.836 0.000
+E 0.090 0.020 4.584 0.000
+W 0.159 0.019 8.296 0.000
male 0.011 0.014 0.803 0.422
religion –0.006 0.014 –0.422 0.673
economics –0.001 0.016 –0.031 0.975
study year 0.011 0.005 2.186 0.029
part 2 –0.016 0.019 –0.868 0.386
F(8,1791) 11.759 0.000
Table 4: RE regression on the micro-level discrimination index in no-interaction 
treatments (N=1800). 
 
Treatment N Mean SD SE
+S +E –W 450 0.224 0.206 0.010
–S +E +W 450 0.413 0.284 0.013
+S –E +W 450 0.477 0.334 0.016
+S +E +W 450 0.483 0.292 0.014
Table 5: Average micro-level discrimination index in treatments with interaction between 
factors. 
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As expected, worker referrals (+W) increased discrimination rates. On the other hand, 
employer referrals (+E) increased discrimination. Higher employer standards led to 
higher discrimination rates. It is important to note that all other variables included in the 
model, i.e., gender, professing a religion, studying economics (vs. all other faculties), the 
year of study, and a dummy included to check for differences between the first and 
second half of the game, had no significant effect except for a weak effect of the study 
year, with senior students who tended to discriminate more. 
 
 
Figure 12. A comparison of model fitted predictions and average observed micro-level 
(upper panel) and macro-level (lower panel) discrimination across all treatments. 
+S 
+W 
+W 
+E 
+S 
+E 
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Treatments including interaction between the manipulated factors led to higher micro-
level discrimination, except when employers with high standards used employer referrals 
(Table 5). All differences with the baseline (–S –E –W) were significant: –S +E +W, +S 
–E +W and +S +E +W led to higher discrimination (W = 82, p = 0.005, W = 70, p = 
0.002, and W = 43, p < 0.001 respectively, all p values were one tailed) while +S +E –W 
led to lower discrimination (W = 226, p = 0.022, one tailed). 
Figure 12 compares the results of treatments. Mean discrimination indexes from each 
treatment are represented with 3D columns. No-interaction treatments are displayed in 
the corners of the triangle, two-way interactions are represented on the edges and the 
three-way interaction is in the centre of the triangle. The –S –E –W baseline treatment is 
used as a basis for comparison. The red area indicates the observed value for the baseline 
treatment and the green area indicates the surplus in the observed values of the given 
treatment compared to the baseline treatment.  
Results showed that the only exception was the +S +E –W treatment, in which observed 
mean values were below the baseline model. This difference is highlighted with orange. 
Fitted model predictions are displayed as black cylinders for all treatments. Orange 
cylinders indicate fitted model predictions for the baseline treatment as a basis of 
comparison. Black cylinders are the upper cylinders. Again, the only exception was the 
+S +E –W treatment, in which fitted model predictions were below the baseline model. A 
comparison of the upper and lower panel of Figure 12 confirms that there treatments had 
a different impact on the micro and macro discrimination indexes. 
The RE model in Table 6, unlike the previous models, includes all treatments. All pure 
and interaction effects were significant in the new model. On the other hand, neither the 
individual variables nor the dummy, which indicated the second part of the game, were 
significant. The signs of all pure factor coefficients were positive, while binary 
interactions led to negative coefficients. On the other hand, only for +S * +E, the 
coefficient was sufficiently large to overcome the pure effect of the factors involved. 
Especially relevant was the large positive interaction effect of all three factors combined. 
  
 
Estimate SE t p
(Intercept) 0.246 0.024 10.175 0.000
+S 0.148 0.019 7.822 0.000
+E 0.084 0.019 4.362 0.000
+W 0.161 0.019 8.476 0.000
+S*+E 
–0.290 0.027 –10.714 0.000
+S*+W 
–0.112 0.027 –4.152 0.000
+E*+W 
–0.115 0.027 –4.257 0.000
+S*+E*+W 0.328 0.039 8.491 0.000
male 0.004 0.010 0.459 0.646
religion 0.014 0.010 1.389 0.165
economics 0.018 0.011 1.614 0.107
study year 0.004 0.004 0.951 0.342
part 2 0.000 0.014
–0.033 0.974
F(12,3587) 28.921 0.000
Table 6: RE regression on the micro-level discrimination index including interaction 
effects (N=3600). 
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V. Discussion 
 
In reality, labor markets suffer from imperfections, inefficient outcomes, and a large 
mismatch between employer demands and worker skills. Although intrinsic qualities and 
skills are difficult to measure, there is hardly any perfectly meritocratic case in which the 
better workers would get the better jobs and no group would suffer from discrepancies in 
employment. Employment discrimination occurs largely because employers are unable to 
observe the individual qualities and skills of employees in advance and have to rely on 
signals and external characteristics at their hiring decisions. Certain recognizable traits 
are not the results of investments, but are the unalienable characteristics of individuals 
and as such, they could be used to differentiate between applicants. Gender, race and age 
are the most salient social categories immediately encoded in case of any interaction. 
When information is hard to collect, recognizable social category membership is often 
used to form group reputations and prejudices which are used as proxies to estimate and 
judge the individual abilities of category members. If there are statistical differences 
between the categories, we talk about statistical discrimination. The most difficult 
problems of discrimination, however, are those when discrimination is not based on 
statistical differences.  
Our aim in this project was to examine why and how discrimination might emerge and be 
maintained in the lack of mean quality differences and considering neutral employers. In 
particular, we demonstrated that discrimination can be pervasive at a labor market also in 
the lack of mean quality differences and if employers with unbiased intentions strive for 
high quality workers. We have come to this conclusion using an agent-based simulation 
model that has been set up in NetLogo and re-implemented in Repast. Re-implementation 
has been rarely done before in social simulation studies, although such an exercise 
radically improves validity of the results. 
We showed that high aspirations of employers increase discrimination rates for a wide 
range of parameters, which might explain why we observe larger inequalities in 
employment at top level jobs. Experimental results confirmed the aspiration effect and 
found a large extent of discrimination in general in all experimental conditions. We have 
run two series of experiments with different settings to arrive at valid conclusions. The 
main advantage of using experimental methodology compared to other empirical methods 
was that we could test the hypothesized associations and mechanisms unambiguously in a 
perfectly controlled environment. 
Simulations highlighted that hiring via social networks, which could either mean 
employing friends, using worker referrals, or business recommendations, lowers 
discrimination rates compared to a market that is composed of isolated employers. These 
results have only received partial support in our laboratory experiments. In particular, in 
the experiments, more in line with the common belief, we found that referral hiring 
contributes to more discrimination at the labor market. Our future task is to get back to 
agent-based modeling and develop the model further to explain this discrepancy. 
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Practical benefits 
 
Both understanding discrimination and fighting discrimination can benefit from our 
research that has investigated previously neglected aspects and underlying reasons of 
observed discrimination. Our research was primarily theoretical, and the innovative 
methods that have been applied were at a higher level of abstraction from reality. This 
had the major advantage, however, that we could analyze certain fundamental 
mechanisms with the perfect exclusion of rival explanations. Our findings about 
fundamental mechanisms can help to understand why anti-discrimination campaigns are 
not fully successful in practice, and can provide advice for forming efficient policies to 
fight discrimination and labor market segregation. Besides policy implications, we have 
something to say also for employers, business practitioners, and human resource 
managers about the fallacies of hiring decisions and best practices to avoid inefficiencies 
related to sampling biases. 
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